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RECENT DECiSIONS

proceedings. See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Meester, 173 Minn. 18,
216 N.W. 329, 330 (1927) ; Stamp v. Eclehardt, 204 Iowa 541, 215 N.W. 609, 611
(1927). The mortgagee should petition for a receiver before attempting to collect the rent pledged. Kooistra v. Gibford, 201 Iowa 275, 207 N.W. 399 (1926).
The Wisconsin court has said that a pledge of rents and profit could be enforced
only by the interposition of the equity court and the appointment of a receiver.
Grether v. Nick, supra.
In the instant case the court ruled that the parties intended the mortgagor
to surrender all possessory rights upon a default in the mortgage payments,
possession then vesting in the mortgagee. This is perhaps adequate as a description of the status of the parties but it is doubtful whether they really understood at the time that such a change in posession was taking place. The fact that
the landlord-owner subsequently negotiated with the tenant as to the rent seems
to indicate she did not consider that the possession had changed. She did, however, file an affidavit in support of the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment in the action, which affidavit recited that the mortgagee was entitled to the
rents according to the terms of the assignment. Thus the court advances the
theory that the parties did intend that there should be an automatic entry or
change in possession upon default, that the assignment carried out this intention
and the affidavit was corroboration thereof. The mortgagee, in possession at the
moment a default occurred was entitled to the rent. The decision reveals a unique
method by which the mortgagee of leased premises may become the landlord
with all the legal remedies incident to such a status, and this without appealing
to the equity court to accomplish dispossession in the traditional manner.
CLIFORD A. RANDALL

TORTS-LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH.-Action brought by administrator
of deceased victim, against the administrator of deceased tortfeasor. The plaintiff's intestate was injured in a collision between his automobile and one driven
by the defendant's intestate. The defendant was dead upon entrance at the hospital; while the plaintiff died a few hours later. By a special verdict the defendant was found 85 per cent negligent and the plaintiff 15 per cent negligent.
Held, No cause of action for wrongful death had arisen during the tortfeasor's
life, and the statute relating to survival of actions operates only on causes of
action which have come into being during the life of the wrongdoer. Hegel v.
George, et al., (Wis. 1935) 259 N.W. 862.
At common law no action would lie to recover damages for the wrongful
death of a human being unless a statute so provided. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campbell
493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). The wrongful causing of death was held to be
a felony and no civil action could be based on it, as the civil wrong was considered to have merged with the felony and redress, if any, could be had only
by a criminal prosecution. Higgins v. Butcher, Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607).
The right of action for a tortious wrong is personal and is destroyed by the
death of either the wronged party or the wrongdoer. Finley v. Chirney, 20 Q.B.D.
494 (1888). There are few decisions contrary to the common law rule that without statute no action for wrongful death will lie. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root
(Conn.) 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (1794); Plummer v. Webb, 19 Fed. Cas. 894
(1825); Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 210 (1838). The right to recover
for wrongful death has been incorporated into the Wisconsin statutes. Wis. STAT.
(1933) §331.03. A distinction should be noted between the "wrongful death"
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statute and the "survival statute ;" one creates a new cause of action, the other
permits a cause of action to be maintained after the death of one of the parties.
Wis. STATS. (1933) §§331.01, 331.03. Prior to 1933 it was established in Wisconsin
that a cause of action for wrongful death did not survive the death of the wrongdoer. Krantz v. Wis. Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40, 143 N.W. 1049, Ann. Cas. 1915 C
1050 (1913) ; Layton v. Rowland, 197 Wis. 535, 222 N.W. 811 (1929) ; Weichinan
v. Huber, 211 Wis. 333, 248 N.W. 112 (1933). This was changed by statute in
Wisconsin; such actions should survive the death of either party. Wis. Laws
(1933) c.53.
A statute must expressly provide for the survival in event of the wrongdoer's death in order to accomplish that purpose. Davis v. Nichols, 54 Ark. 358,
15 S.W. 880 (1891) ; Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500, 5 N.W. 376 (1880). The
"death" statute creates a new action which never accrued to the decedent, and
not having existed until that time it cannot be said to survive unless there is a
specific provision therefor. See Evans (1933) 1 Chi. L. Rev. 102. When the
wrongdoer dies before the injured victim, there is no cause of action against
the personal representatives of the former by those of the latter, as the wrongdoer's prior death prevented a cause of action coming into existence. Beavers v.
Putnam'sAdntr., 110 Va. 713, 67 S.E. 353 (1910). Survival statutes save causes of
action that have already arisen, but do not create a cause of action in favor of
an injured person where the wrongdoer dies before or at the moment that the
cause of action arises. Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933).
It is suggested, therefore, that actions for wrongful death should by specific
provision of statute survive the death of the wrongdoer and that the wrongful
act which may ultimately cause the death of a person should be made actionable
against the wrongdoer's personal representative even though he may have died
before his victim.
OLIVER H. BASSUENER

